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AbsTRACT
This study aims to investigate the relationship among audit quality, 
earnings management, and financial performance among public listed 
companies in Malaysia. Sample companies were randomly selected 
from the Industrial Products and Consumer Products industry listed 
on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia during the time period of 2008 
to 2013. The findings indicate that audit quality does not actually 
constrain earnings management practices in Industrial Products and 
Consumer Products companies. This may be due to the difference 
between the audit environment in Malaysia and that in other developed 
countries. On the other hand, high audit quality can contribute to 
better company financial performance, since large-scale audit firms 
are always perceived to have higher audit quality that can increase 
the confidence of investors. However, when earnings management is 
added as a mediating variable, it mediates the relationship between 
audit quality and financial performance. In other words, the audit 
quality that is delivered by either Big Four audit firms or non-Big Four 
audit firms does not actually improve financial performance when 
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earnings manipulation activities are conducted by the management 
divisions of these firms. 
Key words: earnings management, audit quality, financial 
performance, mediation
InTRoduCTIon
‘Going public’is among the goals of many private companies that desire to achieve 
in order to obtain more capital/funding from the public investors. This is primarily 
because investors prefer to possess liquid securities,since the illiquid stock in private 
companiesis difficult to be valued. As such, companies are motivated to go public 
in order to raise capital and liquidity of their stock. Apart from that, flexibility of 
accounting methods, income smoothing and accruals accounting are employed 
by these companies. The nature of accruals accounting has given opportunities of 
discretion to management in determining the actual earnings of a company. The most 
common approach is to manage the timing of some expenditure or recognition of 
revenues and expenses.Amanet al. (2006) mentioned that the main role of accruals 
accounting is considered to have created some types of earnings management which 
are difficult to differentiate from appropriate accrual accounting choices. Young 
(1999) also stated that managements prefer accruals accounting due to its low 
cost and difficulty to be observed. Consequently, earnings management becomes 
a critical issue that must be handled carefully.
PRobLEM sTATEMEnT
In accordance with the KPMG Malaysia Fraud, Bribery and Corruption Survey 
(2013),as shown in Figure 1, 48% of the survey respondents admitted that they 
have encountered fraud in their companies within the period from January, 2010 to 
December, 2012. Although there is a slight decline of 1% from the 2009 survey, it 
still demonstratesthat fraud is deemed as a significant problem in their companies. 
one of the factors that leads to the occurrence of fraud or material misstatement 
is the manipulation of earnings in the company’s financial reports. Capital 
market, contracting and regulatory motivations are some incentives of managers 
to manage earnings. One of the most important problems that affectsmanagers’ 
behaviors to manage earnings is to access earnings forecasts and meet the market 
expectations,since announcing reported earnings that are less than expected will 
result in adecline in stock value, and thus compromise managers’ positions (Moradi, 
Salehi and najari, 2012). Thus, managers may choose to increase the amount of 
reported earnings, and consequently, the financial performance of the company 
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might reflect the wrong impression oninvestors in a sense that the financial 
performance of the company is improved. 
Besides, managers also manage earnings in order to maximize their wealth. In 
these cases, reported earnings in financial reports might not accurately reflect the 
companies’ underlying economics, which gradually leads to low earnings quality. 
Sincethe reported earnings are regarded to be relevant and useful to investors in 
determining future returns, the reduction in earnings quality in financial reports will 
reduce investors’ confidence. Hence, the lack of investors’ confidence in the reported 
earnings can impact the financial market,since investors are the largest group in 
providing capital support to the economic system. however, Wild (1996) mentioned 
that monitoring systems can restrict the managers’ opportunistic behaviors. An 
external audit system is considered an essential monitoring system that may assist 
in reducing a management’s ability to manage earnings. Hence, external auditors 
play a crucial role in monitoring companies to assure financial reports are free 
from material error and misstatement. In conclusion, a higher quality of audit has 
a greater ability to constrain earnings management,hence reduce the uncertainty 
in the reported earnings. Furthermore, investors are more likely to assess the true 
financial performance of a company as the earnings management practices are 
constrained by external auditors. This study investigates the relationship among 
audit quality, earnings management, and financial performance of public listed 
companies in Malaysia. 
REsEARCh objECTIvEs
1. To examine the relationship between audit quality and earnings management.
Figure 1 KPMG Malaysia fraud, bribery and corruption survey 2013
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2. To determine the association between audit quality and financial performance.
3. To identify the relationship between earnings management and financial 
performance.
4. To examine the relationship among audit quality, earnings management and 
financial performance.
LITERATuRE REvIEw And hyPoThEsIs dEvELoPMEnT
Agency Theory
The agency Theory is a common practice in research that explains the relationship 
between the principal (shareholders) and the agent (managers). Separation of 
ownership and control leads to potential conflicts of interest between both parties. 
This may be because the parties may have different goals, and the managers may not 
act on behalf of the best interests of the shareholders (Br Bukit and Iskandar, 2009; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976).Gerayli, Yanesari and Ma’atoofi (2011) confirmed that 
this agency problem leads to the demand for external auditing.
Earnings Management
Follow the definition of Healy and Wahlen (1999), earnings management occurs 
during which managers manage financial reports by using judgment in order 
to mislead the stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company, or to influence contractual outcomes that are based on the reported 
earnings. This indicates that managements have incentives to manipulate the earnings 
in the purpose of maximizing the wealth of the company and/or the manager. In 
this case, the financial results and position of the business might not be presented 
accurately. This may encourage fraud and material misstatement by the reporting 
companies. Since earnings management involves a higher degree of managerial 
judgment, this study concentrates on the negative aspect of earnings management. 
Jiraporn et al. (2008) mentioned that distortions in financial reports occur when 
there is a misalignment of incentives between managers and shareholders. This 
could drive the managers to exercise the flexibility of accruals accounting to adjust 
earnings opportunistically. hence, accruals earnings management is employed in 
this study, and is considered the opportunistic behavior of the management.
hypothesis development
Previous studies have used earnings management as a mediating variable between 
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corporate governance and a company’s financial performance. However, the 
mediation effect of earnings management on the relationship between audit quality 
and financial performance has not yet been investigated. Hence, this study examines 
the mediation effect of accruals earnings management between audit quality and a 
company’s overall financial performance. Other relationships are also investigated 
in this study, as depicted in Figure 2. The hypotheses were developed based on 
previous studies in the existing body of related literature.
Earnings management
Financial performanceaudit quality
Hypothesis 4
hypothesis 6
hypothesis 5hypothesis 1,2,3
Figure 2 The relationship between audit quality, earnings 
management, and financial performance
Audit Quality and Earnings Management
According to DeAngelo (1981), audit quality is defined as the competency and 
independence of auditors in detecting and reporting material misstatement. zehri 
and Shabou (2011) asserted that high quality auditors are more likely to discover 
questionable accounting practices by clients and report material irregularities and 
misstatements compared with low quality auditors. due to this, a higher audit 
quality is able to better constrain earnings management, and in turn enhance the 
quality of financial reports. Previous research in the related literature have employed 
various measures as proxies of audit quality. Several studies haveindicated that a 
higher quality of auditing mitigates accruals based earnings management (Okolie, 
2014; Soliman and Ragab, 2014; Gerayli, Yanesari and Ma’atoofi, 2011; Becker 
et al., 1998). This study used audit firm size, audit fees, and audit partner as audit 
quality measures. 
A research carried out by Gerayli, Yanesari and Ma’atoofi (2011) demonstrates 
that companies with Big Four audit firms are involved in lower earnings 
management than companies with non-Big Four audit firms. Consistently, Soliman 
and Ragab (2014), and Zgarni, Hlioui and Zehri (2012), confirmed that audit quality 
hasa significant negative association with earnings management when earnings 
management is measured by using discretionary accruals. This indicates that Big 
Four audit firms provide better audit quality than non-Big Four audit firms in 
mitigating accruals based earnings management. However, Yasar (2013) argued 
that the audit quality of Big Four audit firms may not restrain accrual earnings 
management in some institutional environments.
alali (2011) indicated that higher discretionary accruals result in higher audit 
fees in order to constrain the accruals based earnings management practices and 
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improve earnings quality. On the other hand, Gerayli, Yanesari and Ma’atoofi 
(2011), and Okolie (2014), argued that high audit fees have impaired audit 
independence, which leads to poor audit quality, and tolerate greater accruals based 
earnings management.However, Farouk and Hassan (2014) argued that it should 
be remembered that audit firms normally bill their clients based on the number 
of working hours. In other words, high audit fees implyhigh audit effort, which 
gives a sense of responsibility to auditors to provide better quality to their clients.
Okolie (2014) defined audit tenure as the length of the relationship between 
an auditor and a client company. an overly long relationship of auditors with 
clients may constitute a threat to independence. This is because personal ties and 
familiarity may build up among the parties, which may potentially lead toa lower 
level of attentiveness and alertness by the auditor. Piot and Janin (2007) mentioned 
that the auditors may contribute less effort to detect the internal control weakness 
and potential risks, as the audit engagement may become a routine over years. In 
addition, Chi and Huang (2005) confirmed that, for audit partner tenure or audit 
firm tenure, familiarity helps in the auditing process, since it produces a higher 
quality of earnings, but excessive familiarity impairs audit quality.
In Malaysia, there is a provision under the Malaysian Institute of accountants 
(MIA, 2011; paragraph 290.151) By-Laws which states that the lead engagement 
partner should be rotated after a period of not more than five years. In this case, MIA 
By-Laws (2011) support the hypothesis that longer audit tenure is correlated with 
an increase inthe value of accruals based earnings management in the Malaysian 
context.
Audit Quality and Financial Performance
There are a few studies that demonstrate that audit quality improves the financial 
performance of acompany. Afza and Nasir (2014) mentioned that quality of external 
audit improves a firm’s performance due to the perception of investors. They 
perceive that companies that are audited by big audit firms will disclose reliable, 
proper, and authentic financial reports, which strengthen the overall investors’ 
confidence towards these companies. Furthermore, Jusoh, Ahmad and Omar 
(2013) claimed that high audit quality might reduce agency costs where auditors 
provide an indicator about credibility and integrity of financial reports, which 
could in turn lead to lower monitoring costs and result in better performance by the 
corporation. Similarly, Fooladi and Shukor (2012), and Farouk and Hassan (2014), 
reported a significant and positive relationship among audit quality and company 
performance. Hence, audit quality is expected to have a positive relationship with 
financial performance.
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Earnings Management and Financial Performance
Empirical studies implied that there is a significant negative relationship between 
earnings management and financial performance (Farooqi, Harris and Ngo, 2014; 
Ardekani, Younesi and Hashemijoo, 2012; Kang and Kim, 2011). Hassan and 
ahmed (2012) claimed that accruals are the most common activities of earnings 
management that are performed by management to either increase or decrease 
reported earnings. This indicates that the practice of accruals based earnings 
management has negatively affected the financial performance of a company. 
However, Tang and Chang (2014) demonstrated that the relationship between 
earnings management and firm performance varies according to a company’s 
governance quality. Kang and Kim (2011) asserted that accruals based earnings 
management may have anegative impact on shareholders’ accurate access to the 
true financial performance of acompany. Consequently, this may affect the long 
term performance of the company’s response to shocks. In this case, accruals based 
earnings management is expected to have a negative association with the financial 
performance of the company. Regarding this, the measurement of true financial 
performance is stripped of the influence of opportunistic earnings management 
practices by the management, which is expected to reflect the true value of the 
company.
Accruals Earnings Management as a mediator between Audit 
Quality and Financial Performance
as previously mentioned, several studies investigated in terms of earnings 
management whether accruals based activities are negatively associated to financial 
performance of a company (Farooqi, Harris and Ngo, 2014; Ardekani, Younesi 
and Hashemijoo, 2012; Kang and Kim, 2011; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). In this 
case, if external auditors constrain earnings management practices by managers 
effectively, the audit quality may have a positive influence on financial performance 
of the company. Several studies reported a positive relationship between audit 
quality and financial performance (Farouk and Hassan, 2014; Afza and Nasir, 
2014; Jusoh, Ahmad and Omar, 2013; Fooladi and Shukor, 2012). These findings 
providea motivation to investigate whether earnings management enhances the 
causal link between audit quality and financial performance. In the study of 
Kang and Kim (2011), earnings management functions as a mediator between 
corporate governance and company performance. The results suggested that 
earnings management strengthens the causal link between corporate governance 
and firm performance. Therefore, in this study, earnings management functions as 
a mediator, and it is expected that it amplifies the relationship between audit quality 
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and financial performance.
METhodoLogy
sample
This study focuses on the listed Industrial Products and Consumer Products 
companies in the Main Board of Bursa Malaysiaduring the period of 2008 to 2013. 
a total of 100 sample companies were selected randomly from these two industries. 
The purpose of selecting these two industries was in order to minimize the effect of 
industry difference. In this context, companies in the financial services industry are 
not included due to the varying capital and profits of financial companies, which 
adopt a different methodology for estimating discretionary accruals. Secondary 
data were collected from annual reports from Bursa Malaysia and datastream.
determinants of variables
The variables considered are presented in Table 1.
Table 1 Variables and proxies
variables Proxies Labels operationalisation
audit quality 
(aQ – Independent 
variables)
Audit firm size audSIzE A dummy variable; 1 is given to 
the company that is audited by a 
Big Four audit firm;0 otherwise.
audit fees AudFEE natural log of audit fees paid to 
an audit firm in a year.
audit partner 
tenure
TENURE Length of relationship between 
audit partner and client company.
Earnings 
management 
(EM – Mediating 
variables)
discretionary 
accruals 
da Modified Jones Model (1991)
Absolute 
discretionary 
accruals
|da| Absolute value of DA.
Financial 
performance
(FP – Dependent 
variables)
Return on assets ROA Earnings before Interest and Tax 
divided by previous year Total 
assets
True return on 
assets
TROA ROA minus DA 
Control variable Company size SIzE Natural log of company’s total 
average assets
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Modified Jones Model (1991)
Following Etemadi and Moghadam (2014), and Hassan and Ahmed (2012), this 
study employed the Modified Jones Model (1991),which was modified by Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney (1995), and is a more powerful model in detecting earnings 
management. The cash flow statement approach was employed in this paper to 
determine total accruals. Consistent with the study of Br Bukit and Iskandar 
(2009), all the variables are scaled by previous year total assets to reduce the 
heteroskedasticity of the regression.
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where: 
TAt = total accruals of year t;
IBEIt = income before extraordinary items of year t;
OCFt = net cash flows in operating activities of year t;
α0, α1, α2 = estimated coefficients of Modified Jones Model (1991);
TAi,t = total accruals for sample company i in year t;
Ai,t–1 = total assets for sample company i in year t-1;
∆REVi,t = change in net revenues for sample company i in year t;
∆ARi,t = change in account receivables for sample company i in year t;
PPEi,t = grossvalue of property, plant and equipment for sample company i 
in year t;
εi,t = discretionary accruals (error term) for sample company i in year t; 
and
NDAi,t = non-discretionary accruals for sample company i in year t.
The Multiple Regression Model
This study employed a multiple regression model to test the relationship among 
the variables. In testing the multiple regression model, the hypotheses of the study 
were developed for Industrial Products and Consumer Products sectors as follows:
H1	 :	 There	is	a	significantly	negative	association	between	audit	
firm	size	and	accruals	based	earnings	management.
H2	 :	 There	is	a	significantly	negative	association	between	audit	
fees and accruals based earnings management.
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H3	 :	 There	is	a	significantly	positive	association	between	audit	
partner tenure and accruals based earnings management.
H4	 :	 There	is	a	significantly	positive	association	between	audit	
quality	and	financial	performance.
H5	 :	 There	 is	 a	 significantly	 negative	 association	 between	
accruals based earnings management and financial 
performance.
H6 : Accruals based earnings management mediates the 
relationship	 between	 the	 audit	 quality	 and	 financial	
performance.
H7 : The level of accruals based earnings management of 
smaller-sized	 companies	 is	 greater	 than	 larger-sized	
companies.
There is a relationship between the variables if the coefficient is positive or 
negative and statistically significant at the confidence level of 95%.The following 
regression models are employed to investigate the relationship between the variables 
of audit quality, earnings management and financial performance. 
sobel Test
This study used the Sobel test to examine the indirect effect of earnings management 
on the relationship between audit quality and financial performance. It requires 
the standard error that was derived from the multiple regression analysis. Partial 
mediation and full mediation effectsare determined based on the results.
Model 1 : EMi,t = β0 + β1AQi,t + β2SIZEi,t+ εi,t
Model 2 : FPi,t = β0 + β1AQi,t + β2SIZEi,t+ εi,t
Model 3 : FPi,t = β0 + β1EMi,t + β2SIZEi,t+ εi,t
Model 3 : FPi,t = β0 + β1AQi,t + β2EMi,t + β3SIZEi,t+ εi,t
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dIsCussIon
Table 2 Summary of multiple regressions analysis
Model
unstandardised 
coefficients
standardised 
coefficients t-value sig.
b std. error beta
Model 1: AQ & EM
da (Constant) -7.6E-6 0.033 0.000 1.000
audSIzE 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.117 0.907
AudFEE -0.003 0.006 -0.023 -0.470 0.639
TENURE 0.001 0.001 0.030 0.733 0.464
SIzE 0.002 0.004 0.018 0.367 0.714
R2 = 0.001
Adjusted R2 = -0.005
F value = 0.198
F Significance = 0.939
|da| (Constant) 0.083 0.022 3.820 0.000***
audSIzE -0.001 0.002 -0.028 -0.681 0.496
AudFEE -0.004 0.004 -0.043 -0.863 0.389
TENURE 0.001 0.001 0.034 0.848 0.397
SIzE -0.005 0.003 -0.084 -1.723 0.085*
R2 = 0.016
Adjusted R2 = 0.009
F value = 2.413
F Significance = 0.048
Model 2: AQ & FP
ROA (Constant) -0.605 0.075 -8.089 0.000***
audSIzE 0.017 0.006 0.100 2.628 0.009**
AudFEE -0.025 0.015 -0.078 -1.713 0.087*
TENURE 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.173 0.862
SIzE 0.096 0.010 0.428 9.559 0.000***
R2 = 0.170
Adjusted R2 = 0.164
F value = 30.438
F Significance = 0.000
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Model
unstandardised 
coefficients
standardised 
coefficients t-value sig.
b std. error beta
TROA (Constant) -0.604 0.079 -7.626 0.000***
audSIzE 0.017 0.007 0.094 2.441 0.015**
AudFEE -0.022 0.015 -0.066 -1.434 0.152
TENURE 0.000 0.002 -0.006 -0.158 0.875
SIzE 0.094 0.011 0.401 8.872 0.000***
R2 = 0.152
Adjusted R2 = 0.146
F value = 26.645
F Significance = 0.000
Model 3: EM & FP
ROA (Constant) -0.662 0.069 -9.557 0.000***
da 0.187 0.094 0.074 1.990 0.047**
SIzE 0.089 0.008 0.397 10.603 0.000***
R2 = 0.163
Adjusted R2 = 0.161
F value = 58.312
F Significance = 0.000
ROA (Constant) -0.660 0.070 -9.394 0.000***
|da| 0.037 0.141 -0.010 -0.265 0.791
SIzE 0.089 0.008 0.396 10.485 0.000***
R2 = 0.156
Adjusted R2 = 0.155
F value = 56.003
F Significance = 0.000
TROA (Constant) -0.662 0.070 -9.503 0.000***
da -0.770 0.095 -0.293 -8.147 0.000***
SIzE 0.089 0.008 0.378 10.519 0.000***
R2 = 0.228
Adjusted R2 = 0.225
F value = 88.040
F Significance = 0.000
Table 2 (Cont.)
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Model
unstandardised 
coefficients
standardised 
coefficients t-value sig.
b std. error beta
TROA (Constant) - 0.660 0.074 -8.878 0.000***
|da| 0.018 0.149 0.005 0.119 0.905
SIzE 0.089 0.009 0.377 9.888 0.000***
R2 = 0.142
Adjusted R2 = 0.139
F value = 49.370
F Significance = 0.000
Model 4: AQ, EM & FP
ROA (Constant) -0.605 0.075 -8.108 0.000***
audSIzE 0.017 0.006 0.100 2.625 0.009**
AudFEE -0.024 0.015 -0.076 -1.679 0.094*
TENURE 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.115 0.909
da 0.183 0.093 0.073 1.957 0.051*
SIzE 0.096 0.010 0.427 9.551 0.000***
R2 = 0.175
Adjusted R2 = 0.168
F value = 25.232
F Significance = 0.000
ROA (Constant) -0.602 0.076 -7.946 0.000***
audSIzE 0.017 0.006 0.100 2.628 0.009**
AudFEE -0.025 0.015 -0.078 -1.719 0.086*
TENURE 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.182 0.856
|da| -0.036 0.141 -0.010 -0.254 0.800
SIzE 0.096 0.010 0.428 9.559 0.000***
R2 = 0.170
Adjusted R2 = 0.163
F value = 24.325
F Significance = 0.000
Table 2 (Cont.)
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Model
unstandardised 
coefficients
standardised 
coefficients t-value sig.
b std. error beta
TROA (Constant) -0.604 0.075 -8.041 0.000***
audSIzE 0.017 0.006 0.096 2.613 0.009**
AudFEE -0.024 0.015 -0.073 -1.670 0.095*
TENURE 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.081 0.936
da -0.774 0.094 -0.294 -8.218 0.000***
SIzE 0.096 0.010 0.407 9.477 0.000***
R2 = 0.239
Adjusted R2 = 0.232
F value = 37.209
F Significance = 0.000
TROA (Constant) -0.606 0.080 -7.551 0.000***
audSIzE 0.017 0.007 0.094 2.442 0.015**
AudFEE -0.022 0.015 -0.066 -1.426 0.154
TENURE 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.162 0.871
|da| 0.022 0.149 0.006 0.150 0.881
SIzE 0.094 0.011 0.402 8.853 0.000***
R2 = 0.152
Adjusted R2 = 0.145
F value = 21.826
F Significance = 0.000
Note: *Significant at 0.10 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; *** significant at 0.01 level.
According to the multiple regressions analysis, Model 1 examines the 
relationship audit quality and earnings management. as previously mentioned, 
absolute discretionary accruals are used to test the association between audit quality 
and earnings management, hence, this section focuses on absolute discretionary 
accruals. Based on Table 2, the results demonstrate that there is no statistically 
significant linear dependence of the mean of earnings management towards the 
proxies of audit quality, which are audit firm size, audit fees, and audit partner 
tenure, although there is a relationship between them. This indicates that audit 
quality does not really affect the earnings management practices of Malaysian public 
listed companies in the industry of Industrial Products and Consumer Products.
This may be because the audit environment in Malaysia is different than that of 
other developed countries such as the US and the UK. 
Table 2 (Cont.)
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Prior to 2010, there wasno effective audit and oversight mechanism for 
auditors in Malaysia. The Audit Oversight Board (AOB) that was established in 
Malaysia on 1 April 2010, which is an oversight mechanism for auditors, may be 
relatively new. Thus, the efforts and effects to motivate auditors to provide high 
quality audits by AOB may not be obvious and evident duringthe first few years. 
In such institutional environments, auditors may not be constrainedto the practices 
of earnings management of their client companies,since there is no difference in 
audit quality between Big Four audit firms and non-Big Four audit firms, as well 
as audit fees. The effort of the AOB in promoting higher audit quality may be 
effective in the following years, and thus, the earnings management may become 
better constrained. For audit partner tenure, the result is not significant. This may 
be due to the audit partner tenure becoming shorter, which is on average two years 
after the implementation of the mandatory audit partner rotation of five years. 
Audit partners tend to be rotated more frequently when there is a mandatory audit 
partner rotation, and thus, this results in no significant relationship with earnings 
management practices.
In Model 2, the relationship between audit quality and financial performance 
wasexamined. The results revealed that audit firm size is statistically significant 
(p-value = 0.009) and positively correlated with ROA, with a t-value of 2.628. 
Moreover, audit firm size is also statistically significant (p-value = 0.015) and 
positively correlated with TROA, with a t-value of 2.441. This indicates that 
Big Four audit firmshavea higher audit quality, which results in better financial 
performance by the companies compared to non-Big Four audit firms. This may 
because companies usually audited by Big Four audit firm are perceived to have a 
higher audit quality that can improve the financial performance of the companies. 
In addition, a high quality of external auditing may increase investors’ confidence 
on the audited financial reports. In this case, less monitoring costs may be incurred, 
as Big Four auditors tend to provide a higher audit quality, which increases integrity 
and credibility of the financial reports. Therefore, this can result in better financial 
performance by the companies.
On the other hand, no statistically significant linear dependence of the mean of 
ROA and TROA on audit fees was found, although there is a negative relationship 
between audit fees and financial performance. This suggeststhat a higher audit 
quality in terms of higher audit fees do not definitely affect the company’s financial 
performance. For audit partner tenure, there was also no statistically significant 
linear dependence of the mean of ROA and TROA on it. In this case, mandatory 
audit partner rotation in Malaysia does not have a significant effect on the company’s 
financial performance. One of the possible explanations for audit fees is that, in some 
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cases, high audit fees charged by audit firms will result in higher costs incurred, 
and thus, will lead to lower income generated by the business. Moreover, audit 
partner tenure does not affect the financial performance of the companies, which is 
probably because investors do not view the length of the auditor-client relationship 
as a threat which may affect the company’s performance.
Model 3 tested the relationship between earnings management and financial 
performance. No statistically significant linear dependence of the mean of financial 
performance on absolute discretionary accruals wasdetected. However, there 
is a statistically significant linear dependence of the mean of ROA on signed 
discretionary accruals (p-value = 0.047), and both of them are positively correlated, 
with a t-value of 1.990. This indicates that accrual based earnings management 
practices in Malaysia do havea significant impact on financial performance, 
whereby when a company tends to exercise income-increasing accruals, the 
financial performance tends to be better, and vice versa. For instance, when the 
manager’s goal is to maximize the company’s value, he or she tends to exercise 
income-increasing accruals to advance the recognition of sales revenue by credit 
sales in order to increase the overall revenue. Consequently, this can improve the 
financial performance of the company. On the other hand, a manager may also 
exercise income-decreasing accruals (e.g., increase the provision forthe purpose 
of increasing expenses) so that it will result in lower financial performance. This 
may occur when in the case the company intends to show poor performance so 
that other companies will not acquire it or take it over.
on the other hand, the results reveal that signed discretionary accruals are 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.000) and negatively correlated with TROA, 
with a t-value of -8.147. This demonstrates that, when the management of the 
company tends to increase earnings, the true value of financial performance is 
actually lower than the face value shown in financial reports, and vice versa.
True financial performance (TROA) is stripped of the influence of opportunistic 
earnings management practices by management, which is expected to reflect the 
true value of the company. Therefore, when financial performance reflects the true 
value of the company, it shows that when true financial performance is lower, the 
management tends to increase the income by exercising the discretion over the 
accruals, thus increasing the reported performance, and vice versa. This may be 
because companies tends to report an average financial performance so that they 
will not be questioned by the investors or other stakeholders about the overvalued 
or undervalued financial performance. 
In Model 4, the relationship amongaudit quality, earnings management, and 
the financial performance is investigated. The overall results and significant level 
of this model are composed of the combination of Models 1, 2, and 3. Besides, 
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the results generated from the Sobel test showed insignificant results for the 
mediation effect of earnings management on the relationship between audit quality 
and financial performance. This reveals that there is a full mediation effect of 
accruals based earnings management on the relationship between audit quality and 
financial performance, when audit quality is measured by audit firm size. Thus, H6 
is supported, which indicates that accruals based earnings management mediates 
the relationship between audit quality and financial performance. 
Similar to Model 2, the results have shown a positive significant association 
between audit quality and financial performance. However, when accruals based 
earnings management is added as a mediating variable, no significant relationship 
is found between audit quality and financial performance. In other words, audit 
quality no longer affects the company’s financial performance after accruals based 
earnings management has been controlled. This may be because the auditors are 
unable to detect the earnings management practices. Thus, this results in the audit 
quality delivered by Big Four audit firms having no effect on financial performance, 
as there is no difference in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four audit 
firms. In addition, investors are perceived that Big Four auditors deliver higher audit 
quality, and provide proper and reliable financial reports. Hence, the management 
tends to employ big audit firms in order to exercise the earnings manipulation 
activities. In this case, audit quality no longer improves the financial performance. 
Hence, it is suggested that accruals based earnings management mediates between 
audit quality and financial performance. In terms of audit fees and audit partner 
tenure, the mediating effect is not applicable becausethe relationship between them 
and financial performance is not significant, even though earnings management is 
not added as a mediating variable.
In terms of the control variable, the results of this study demonstrated that 
there is a negative, but an insignificant, relationship between the control variable 
of company size andthe mediating variable (earnings management), which is 
measured by using absolute discretionary accruals. This means that the management 
will exercise their discretion over accruals,regardless of whether the size of the 
company is small or large. This may be because the earnings management is affected 
by factors other than company size, such as the company’s ownership, leverage, 
and market to book value. On the other hand, the findings have demonstrated that 
there is a significant positive relationship between company size and financial 
performance. This reveals that the financial performance of larger-sized companies 
is better than that of smaller-sized companies. This may be because a larger-sized 
company has more resources and capital to operate their business in order to 
maximize its overallvalue.
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ConCLusIon
This paper investigated the relationship between audit quality, earnings manage-
ment, and financial performance in the Industrial Products and Consumer 
Products sector for Malaysian public listed companies. Various proxies were used 
in the study to measure the audit quality. The results revealed that audit quality 
does not truly constrain the earnings management practices in Industrial Products 
and Consumer Products companies. This may be because Malaysia has an audit 
environment that is different than that of other developed countries such as the 
US and the UK. Therefore, the theory of audit quality in mitigating earnings 
management is not always valid in developing countries.
Besides, the findings also indicated that companies in Malaysia exercise 
income-increasing and income-decreasing accruals in order to achieve their 
objectives. It also shows that the companies are more likely to report an average 
financial performance so that they will not be questioned by the investors or 
other stakeholders about their overvalued or undervalued financial performance.
Consequently, the investors might not access the company’s true financial 
performance. On the other hand, high audit quality can contribute to better company 
financial performance. This is because big audit firms are always perceived to 
have higher audit quality, and thus, increase the investors’ confidence in financial 
reports. However, when earnings management is added as a mediating variable, it 
mediates the relationship between audit quality and financial performance. In this 
case, the audit quality that is delivered by either Big Four audit firms or non-Big 
Four audit firms doesnot truly improve the financial performance when earnings 
manipulation activities are conducted by the management.
REFEREnCEs
Afza, T., and Nazir, M. S. (2014). Audit Quality and Firm Value. Research Journal of Apllied 
Science, Engineering and Technology, 7(9), 1803-1810.
AiniAman, TakiahMohd. Iskandar, Pourjalali, H., and Teruya, J. (2006). Earnings 
Management in Malaysia: a Study on Effects of accounting Choices. Malaysian 
Accounting Review, 5(1), 185-209.
ArefMahdaviArdekani, NejatYounesi, and Mohammad Hashemijoo. (2012) Acquisition, 
Earnings Management and Firm’s Performance: Evidence from Malaysia. Journal of 
Business Studies Quarterly, 4(1), 91-110.
Becker, C., DeFond, M., Jiambalvo, J., and Subramanyam, K. R. (1998). The effect of audit 
quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research, 15(1), 1–24.
229
The Relationship among Audit Quality, Earnings Management, and Financial Performance
Chi, W., and Huang, H. (2005). Discretionary Accruals, Audit-Firm Tenure and Audit-
Partner Tenure: Empirical Evidence from Taiwan. Journal of Contemporary accounting 
& Economics, 1, 65-92.
Cohen, D. A., and Zarowin, P. (2010). Accrual-based and earnings management activities 
around seasoned equity offerings. Journal of accounting and Economics, 50, 2-19.
DeAngelo, L. (1981). Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
3(3), 183-199.
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., Sweeney, A. P. (1995). Detecting Earnings Management. The 
Accounting Review, 70(2), 193-225.
Etemadi, H., and Moghadam, H. R. (2014). The Competition between Regression and 
Artificial Neural Network Models in Earning Management Predicetion. International 
Review of Business Research Papers, 10(2), 148-159.
Farooqi, J., Harris, O., and Ngo, T. (2014). Corporate diversification, real activities 
manipulation, and firm value. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 27, 
130-151.
Farouk, M. A., and Hassan, S. U. (2014). Impact of Audit Quality and Financial Performance 
of Quoted Cement Firms in Nigeria. International Journal of Accounting and Taxation, 
2(2), 01-22.
Fatima Alali. (2011). Audit fees and discretionary accruals: compensation structure effect. 
Managerial auditing Journal, 26(2), 90-113.
Gerayli, M. S., Yanesari, A. M., and Ma’atoofi, A. R. (2011). Impact of Audit Quality on 
Earnings Management: Evidence from Iran. International Research Journal of Finance 
and Economics, (66).
hassan, S. U., and ahmed, a. (2012) Corporate governance, Earnings Management and 
Financial Performance: A Case of Nigeria Manufacturing Firms. American International 
Journal of Contemporary Research, 2(7), 214-226.
Healy, P.M., and Wahlen, J. M. (1999). A Review of the Earnings Management Literature 
and Its Implications for Standard Setting. Accounting Horizons, 13(4), 365-383.
Jensen, M., and Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
Jiraporn, P., Miller, g. a., Soon, S. Y., and Young, S. K. (2008). Is earnings management 
opportunistic or beneficial? An agency theory perspective. International Review of 
Financial Analysis, 17, 622-634.
Kang, S., and Kim, Y. (2011). does Earnings Management amplify The association Between 
Corporate Governance And Firm Performance?: Evidence From Korea. International 
Business & Economics Research Journal, 10(2), 53-66.
230
International Journal of Economics and Management
KPMG. (2013). Malaysia Fraud, Bribery and Corruption Survey 2013. Retrieved from https://
www.kpmg.com/MY/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/2013/fraud-
survey-report.pdf.
Malaysian Institute of Accountants. (2011). By-Laws (On Professional Ethics, Conduct and 
Practice) of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants. Kuala Lumpur.
Masood Fooladi and Zaleha Abdul Shukor (2012). Board of Directors, Audit Quality and 
firm performance: Evidence from Malaysia. Paper presented at the National Research & 
Innovation Conference for Graduate Students in Social Science, Mahkota Hotel, Melaka. 
Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2259523
Mohd Abdullah Jusoh, AyoibChe Ahmad, and Baharudin Omar. (2013). Managerial 
Ownership, Audit Quality and Firm Performance in Malaysian. International Journal of 
Arts and Commerce, 2(10), 45-58.
Moradi, M., Salehi, M., and Najari, M. (2012). A Study of the Effective Variables on Earning 
Management: Iranian Evidence. Research Journal of Applied Sciences, Engineering and 
Technology, 4(17), 3088-3094.
Okolie, A. O. (2014). Audit Tenure, Audit Independence and Accrual–based Earnings 
Management of Quoted Companies in nigeria. European Journal of accounting auditing 
and Finance Research, 2(2), 63-90.
Piot, C., and Janin, R. (2007). External Auditors, Audit Committees and Earnings 
Management in France. European Accounting Review, 16(2), 429-454.
Rina Br Bukit, and TakiahMohdIskandar. (2009). Surplus Free Cash Flow, Earnings 
Management and audit Committee. International Journal of Economics and Management, 
3(1), 204–223.
Soliman, M. M., and Ragab, A. A. (2014). Audit Committee Effectiveness, Audit Quality and 
Earnings Management: An Empirical Study of the Listed Companies in Egypt. Research 
Journal of Finance and Accounting, 5(2), 155-166.
Wild, J. (1996). The audit Committee and Earnings Quality. Journal of accounting, auditing 
and Finance, 11, 247-276.
Yasar, A. (2013). Big Four Auditors’ Audit Quality and Earnings Management: Evidence 
from Turkish Stock Market. International Journal of Business and Social Science, 4(17), 
153-163.
Young, S. (1999). Systematic measurement error in estimation of accruals: an evaluation of 
alternative modelling procedures. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 26(7/8), 
833-862.
231
The Relationship among Audit Quality, Earnings Management, and Financial Performance
Zgarni, I., Hlioui, K., and Zehri, F. (2012). Audit Quality and Earnings Management in the 
Tunisian Context. International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting, 2(2), 
17-33.
Zehri, F., and Shabou, R. (2011). Audit Quality, Corporate Governance and Earnings 
Management in the Context of Tunisian Firms. Journal of Administrative & Economics 
Science, 1(1).

